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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARRIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Civil No. 981484-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in calculating Ms. Johnson's potential and 
Mr. Johnson's actual income and then using those figures to improperly to determine Ms. 
Johnson's alimony award and both parties' child support obligation? 
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2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding non-terminable alimony for five 
years followed by eight years of alimony terminable upon Ms. Johnson's remarriage or 
cohabitation? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allocating the parties' marital properly and 
debt which includes personal property in the possession of Ms. Johnson? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Johnson to pay one-half of 
all daycare expenses incurred by Ms. Johnson while she seeks an additional advanced 
degree? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the right to claim two of the 
children as tax exemptions to Ms. Johnson absent a showing that she would receive any tax 
benefit from the exemptions? 
6. Did the trial court err in failing to order Ms. Johnson to reimburse or otherwise 
compensate Mr. Johnson for that portion of his $89,000 inheritance she appropriated. 
7. Did the trial court err in ordering Mr. Johnson to pay the premiums for health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the children without reimbursement or contribution from 
Ms. Johnson? 
8. Did the trial court err in ordering Mr. Johnson to pay Ms. Johnson's attorney fees? 
3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the trial court's legal determinations for correctness and is free to 
decide the matter for itself without deference to the trial court's determinations. State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact 
for an abuse of discretion. Endrodv v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-69 (Utah App. 1996). 
In divorce proceedings, this Court reviews the trial court's property division and 
alimony award for an abuse of discretion. Endrody, supra, at 1168-69. The trial court 
abuses its discretion by failing to enter specific, detailed findings to support its financial 
determinations. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). Adequate findings 
require sufficient detail and the inclusion of enough underlying facts to disclose the steps 
taken by the court in reaching the ultimate conclusion with respect to each factual issue. Id. 
Whether a trial court's findings support an award of attorney fees is a question of law 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Endrody. supra, at p. 1169. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (1996) 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(3) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.17 (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.21 (1996) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and orders entered in a 
divorce action in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding where the court entered orders dealing with support, 
alimony, division of property, debts and attorneys fees. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Ms. Johnson petitioned the court for a divorce on December 13, 1996. (R. at 1). Ms 
Johnson further requested an award of temporary custody of the parties' three minor 
children, temporary child support and temporary alimony pending the court's disposition of 
her petition. (R. at 9). The court awarded Ms. Johnson temporary custody of the children 
and ordered Mr. Johnson to pay temporary child support and alimony pending trial. (R. at 
45). 
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A bench trial was held February 5th and 6th, 1998. (R. at 580-81). The trial court took 
the matter under advisement and subsequently made its' rulings, and issued proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 26, 1998. (R. 381-94). The parties filed 
motions asking for clarification of the court's ruling and proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law. (R. at 376-80; R. at 405-08). The court entered final judgment on July 
20, 1998. (R. at 484-94) 
Disposition in the Trial Court 
The district court awarded primary physical custody and sole legal custody to Ms. 
Johnson with Mr. Johnson receiving full statutory rights and benefits as the noncustodial 
parent in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (1998). (R. at 485). The court awarded 
Ms. Johnson child support in the amount of $1,482.00 per month and $1,518.00 monthly 
alimony. (R. at 490-91). Mr. Johnson was ordered to pay alimony unconditionally for the 
first five years, irrespective of Ms. Johnson's remarriage or cohabitation with another man, 
or any other number of factors that could materially affect Ms. Johnson's economic situation. 
(R. at 490). Following the five year period of unconditional alimony, Mr. Johnson will have 
to continue making alimony payments to Ms. Johnson unless she remarries or cohabitates 
with another man. (R. at 490). It is possible that Mr. Johnson may be required to make 
alimony payments for thirteen years. (R. at 490). Mr. Johnson was denied any share of the 
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over $27,000.00 equity in the family home. Mr. Johnson was also ordered to maintain and 
pay the premium for a health and accident insurance policy for the benefit of the children 
without reimbursement or contribution from Ms. Johnson. (R. at 489-90). Finally, Mr. 
Johnson was ordered to pay Ms. Johnson's attorney's fees in the amount of $20,000.00. (R. 
at 491). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Carrie Johnson and Jeffrey Don Johnson first met in 1983 while attending Brigham 
Young University. (R. at 580 pp. 72, Ls. 8-12). They were married in June of 1984 and both 
continued their educations. (R. at 580 p. 71, Ls. 10-12). Mr. Johnson's grandfather provided 
a home for the parties to live in while they attended school. (R. at 580, p.6, Ls 13-22; R. at 
580, p. 74, Ls. 4-8). The parties did not have to pay rent or make any mortgage payments. 
Indeed, they received approximately $275 a month in income from renting out the part of the 
home that they did not use. (R. at 580, p.6, Ls 13-22; R. at 580, p. 74, Ls. 4-8). 
Both parties graduated from BYU in August of 1987, with Ms. Johnson receiving an 
English degree with a teaching certificate and Mr. Johnson receiving a zoology degree. (R. 
at 580 p. 75, Ls. 2-12). That same month, the parties relocated to Northern California where 
Mr. Johnson had been admitted to podiatry school. (R. at 580 p. 76, Ls. 3-6). 
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Ms. Johnson neither sought nor obtained teaching certification while in California but 
instead performed office w ork in a podiatry office during Mr. Johnson's graduate studies. 
(R. at 580 nn 201 r " l-Mn* : , t •• Johnson obtained 
substantial student loans in an amount, including interest, between $110,000 and $120,000 
which was utilized to pay tuition and living expenses. (R. at 581 p. 282, Ls. 18-22). 
{
 , j obtained a residency MI i^Ol, 
earning $1,000 per month. (R. at 58 t ^r : ? I Once Mr Johnson stavi< ^ ?• ^ , 
Ms. Johnson ceased working outside of the home, (R at 58f- ?02. Ls 10-18; R. at 580 p. 
1 . j^idci.w > in l yy j , the parties returned 
to Utah and Mr. Johnson started his podiatry nracfn 
1994, the parties purchased a home and used monies from Mr. Johnson's grandfather for the 
dow \ 
e _ • ' Although Ms. Johnson ceased working outride * >* ti »p i u n i »*» « i i o o i che d id pe i form 
occasional office workforMr Johnson from April of 199-
 7 of 1995, for which 
she wa^
 t • * >u , _ pen^aicaiiy as a babysitter, (R. at 580, pp. 
106-07; R. at 580 p. 109, Ls. 10-24). Howevei MINT " - p - v * , • "\ " p ' 
J o h n s o n h a s n o t sough t e m p l o y m e n t in n mt'diVal office a n d h a s no t earned a n y i n c o m e . (R. 
«i( ^80 ( ii I in i ii i\ ai )t
 r . , io-ifc). ' 
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In 1996, Mr. Johnson received a $ 10,000 living trust distribution from his grandfather. 
(R. at 580 p. 135, Ls. 15-21). That same year Mr. Johnson received a $79,000 inheritance 
from his mother's estate. (R. at 580 p. 136, Ls. 8-14). Nearly all of the inheritance money 
was supposedly utilized by Ms. Johnson to pay off the parties' joint credit card debt and Ms. 
Johnson's personal expenditures. (R. at 580 p. 222-223; R. at 581, p. 346-48). The monthly 
payments on Mr. Johnson's student loan debt amount to at least $ 1,700 per month. (R. at 
581 p. 283, Ls. 22-25) and none of the $89,000 inheritances went to pay the student loan 
debt. 
Three children were born during the marriage, Heather Aaron (11/2/88), Ansley 
Brook (4/29/92) and Kevyn Kathleen (7/12/95). (R. at 580 p. 71, Ls. 8-18). In the time 
between their separation and divorce (1996-1997), Ms. Johnson worked 3 or 4 days in 1996 
as a substitute teacher and 30 days in 1997. (R. at 580 pp. 231-32). Aside from substitute 
teaching, Ms. Johnson testified that she had not seriously sought any other employment and 
she did not seek to re-certify her teaching credentials until June of 1997. (R. at 580 pp. 234-
35). Ms. Johnson has not sought teaching positions, temporary or otherwise, outside of the 
Davis School District, testifying that she "cannot" apply in the Salt Lake District because she 
has children; this is despite the fact that the children are at school or in daycare throughout 
9 
the school day. (R. at 580 pp. 235-36). N is. Johnson admitted that she had turned down 
siiili'.iiiijie teaching ohers. \k, ai bW pp. 237-38). 
ARGUMENT SLIVUVIAK I 
The trial court abused its discretion in utilizing an erroneous calculation of Ms. 
Johnso .. potential monthly income, and Mr Johnson's actual income to determine the 
parties' child support obliuatioi obligation. The trial court's 
award of five years non-terminable alimony followed h*' eirH vears of nliini iini i.ie 
upon Ms. Johnson's remarriage or cohabitation also constitutes an abuse of discretion. In 
addition, the trial * , Jay care expenses while Ms. 
Johnson obtains further post-secondan education, the uemai 
in the marital home, and tne requi^ that Mr. Johi^on pay credit card debt for an item 
of personal nmm ;
 t vJii^titutes an abuse of discretion. The 
trial court further abused its discretion by ordering Mr Unison In IM*, I I ml I I 
accident insurance for the benefit of the children without any i eim in L iiiiiit or contribution 
from Ms, Johnson, Final] .. mson to pay Ms Johnson's 
attorney fees. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Calculating Ms. Johnson's Potential 
and Mr. Johnson's Actual Income and then Utilizing this Amount to Determine 
Ms. Johnson's Alimony Award and Both Parties' Child Support Obligation 
A. Ms. Johnson's Income 
The trial court abused its discretion in imputing only $1,000.00 per month income to 
Ms. Johnson and utilizing this amount to determine the parties' child support obligations and 
Mr. Johnson's alimony obligation. A trial court may properly impute income to a party when 
it determines that party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1996); Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) (finding no error in 
trial court's decision to impute income to husband who had a bachelor's degree and whose 
pursuit of further education did not qualify as "career or occupational training to establish 
basic job skills."); but see Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(d) (iii) (1996) ("Income may not 
be imputed if... a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job 
skills."). After finding one party to be voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the trial 
court may impute income to that party based on employment potential, probable earnings in 
light of the party's work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1996). 
If the party to whom income is being imputed has no recent work histoiy, "income shall be 
11 
imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work w eek. To impute a greater 
income, the judge in a juaici^
 r , tuc presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter >:v ^ tV findings ••'*.. * »abis for the imputation." 
Id. §78-45-7.5(7)(c) (emphasis added) W hen a trial com! order is premised upon a statute 
• % 11 u 111 equires specific findings and the trial court fails to make such findings, the order may 
not be affirmed on appeal unle*- ^,n »• ^oive ine controversy may be 
reasonably implied from the record, hcc liall v. Hall s,vp^ 
Here, the trial court imputed income to Ms. Johnson after concluding that she "has 
a Bachelor's Degree in liijjjisli .IIIIJ (Ih1 i "uinl IIIIJ •„ she has the ability to work and to earn 
income of at least $1,000.00 per month." Because $1,000.00 per monlh ;nih mils U itini",," 
than full-time minimum wage employment, which would only equal $885.80 per month, it 
is fair to assume iliji ill i i m n|i \\u M JL'H'.IIII IMUJIIIL In iviv •'««iliiison based upon her skills 
and educational background. That is, the court imputed incon i UUMI j 
her ability to earn an income greater than minimum wage, but tail
 r ^ jn what basis 
it was imputim , onnson. 
Ms. Johnson testified that when she started working & thp FWI-, * 
1987 her starting salary was $ 18,000 per year and that she received an annual raise each year 
nrked th<- lom ;ne area in 1991.
 : R nt ^ n p 97, Ls. 19-22.). 
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Ms. Johnson also testified that she did not look into working at a medical office following 
the parties' separation because she "did not like the hours. . . ." (R. at 580 p. 202, Ls. 10-
18). She further testified that she did not consider going back into teaching until July of 
1997 and that although she had applied to substitute teach in the Davis County school 
district, she had declined to apply to the Salt Lake school districts because she had children. 
(R. at 580 p. 236, Ls. 2-11). 
Connie Romboy, a vocational evaluator/career counselor who testified on Ms. 
Johnson's behalf, stated that had Ms. Johnson immediately entered into the teaching field in 
Davis School District in 1987, she would have earned $15,635 annually to start and would 
have earned the same amount until 1990 because the district failed to award pay increases 
during this three year period. (R. at 580 pp. 408-09). Ms. Romboy further testified that in 
subsequent years teachers received anywhere from a six (6) to eight (8) percent pay increase 
per year. Presuming Ms. Johnson would have received a seven (7) percent annual increase 
for the 1991 to 1997 years, Ms. Johnson would be earning $20,482. The statewide average 
teacher's salary was similar. (R. at 581 p. 409, Ls. 9-13). Romboy also testified that in 
addition to salary, teachers earned pay incentives each year, ranging anywhere from $2,000 
to $4,000, depending upon the district. (R. at 581 pp. 409-10). 
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Given Ms. Johnson's income history, qualifications and experience, it is reasonable 
„oiu a.ai iik. .iimimum poten* ~m~ ~he could earn is $15,635. This 
amount was the starting wage for a f r an" In • , the 
year she graduated and presumably could have started teaching. This would render her 
mi 1111mi 1 1 1 1 i in\ ome approximately .,.,..* *...t > 1,000. However, even this $15,635 figure is 
ten years out of date and fails jonnson could be 
earning, which Ms. Romboy testified would range anywhere from $2,000 to $4,000 ann», Is
 9 
depending upon the school district. I hus, biased upon her own expert witnesses testimony, 
Ms. Johnson was capable . -S«-. ? 
B. Mr. Johnson's Income 
The trial court also abused its discretion in calculating Mr. Johnson's income and then 
using that fieiirr i r> J> ^
 ? and child support he would be obligated 
to pay. For child support purposes Mr. Johnson's income b "' hi1 "i jl< uil-iin , i i ,n i »g 
necessary expenses requii ed for self-employment or business operat i ii gross receipts. 
The income and expen < * "
 r a anon of a business shall be reviewed 
1
 This amount includes the 1987 starting salary of $15,635 plus the minimum pay incentive 
- -*\ SeeR. at 580 pp. 408-10. 
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to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award." Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (1953, as amended). 
The trial court abused its discretion by using an average of the deposits that Mr. 
Johnson made to his business account as a determination of his income without giving him 
credit for monies that he had transferred from his savings which consisted of gifts and not 
income. (R. at 581 pp. 477-79). It is undisputed that Mr. Johnson's savings consisted of 
monies that he had received as gifts from his grandfather and others. (R. at 581 p. 327, 330). 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that one of the reason Mr. Johnson had to transfer the money 
that he had received as gifts from his savings account to checking was because of the 
approximately $16,000.00 that Mr. Johnson had to re-pay to Medicare. (R. at 581 p. 327). 
It was also established that Mr. Johnson does not expect to receive any more gifts from his 
grandfather. (R. at 581 p. 307 Ls. 3-14). As a result, the trial court mistakenly used an 
average of Mr. Johnson's deposits instead of his gross receipts as required by statute. 
Transfer to and from the savings to the checking account are not consistent with the actual 
income received by Mr. Johnson. Using the deposits as the basis of income has no 
correlation to his actual income and was therefore improperly used by the trial court to 
determine his income. 
15 
TV ;:" ilso abused Us discretion and demonstrated a fundamental 
misunderstanding 01 me i inanciai v r presented by the respondent. Specifically, the trial 
court stated in the Finding *' * niriirlinn 1111111 1 1 1 .1 iilliii.iii iliac were discrepancies 
between the respondent's stated income and his tax retunis. (R. at 581 pp 177 7K | I 0 
support this finding u^ 1; ial court relied uii the 1099's that were submitted by the respondent. 
( R . a u o i p . i t / / / ,:.„.„ ...nil IUVWS v\ae from 
1997 and not 1996 as clearly identified on the forms. (R at ^81 p * "* ' 1 
i tound that the income reported on the 1099 forms did not correspond to the tax return 
filed by the responde ermination, me 1 w . . torms from 1996 
add' up precisely to the income that the respondent reported 1l >' h 1 ,i \ 
return, $97,549.00. (R. at 581 p. 328). There simply is no discrepancy. The trial court used 
incorrect figures in in 1 i' i, 1 ,; I ill : , Umliii}'; 1 
The trial court also abused its discretion by not making adeq* 
respondent's reasonable expenses or sufficiently examining Mr. Johnson's ability to pay. 
The trial court failed to follow I 'lull 1.1'.i l.iv1. .VIIK.II iu|iurcs a court to consider and make 
adequate findings with regard to "(1) the financial condition1 ,11 ml iin ml i il 0 1 in n» 
^ ^ ) tne ability ui the receiving spouse to support him .:»• herself; and (3) the ability 
ui uie navor spnn A
 v. jjreinholt 905 P.2d 877, 879 
16 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1995). In this case the trial court did not make any findings with regard to Mr. 
Johnson's ability to pay. 
It is undisputed that the respondent took out approximately $120,000.00 in student 
loans. (R. at 581 p. 282-83). Furthermore, it is undisputed that two of those loans must be 
repaid in full immediately and that loan consolidation is not an option for Mr. Johnson. (R. 
at 581 pp. 283, 297-98). More importantly, the respondent established, and the petitioner 
did not rebut the fact that if Mr. Johnson cannot repay those loans he will lose 95% of his 
income because he will no longer qualify as a Medicare provider. (R. at 581 pp. 322-23). 
Mr. Johnson also established that his income from Medicare was expected to diminish 
because of recent events and trends in the market. (R. at 581 pp. 336-37). Despite this 
important information, the trial court determined that Mr. Johnson had an ability to pay. (R. 
at 477). 
The court similarly failed to make any findings with regard to Mr. Johnson's 
reasonable business expenses but merely stated that $40,000 per year was reasonable. (R. 
at 581 p. 477). Both parties gave testimony concerning their reasonable expenses. However, 
petitioner did not question or dispute the expenses claimed by Mr. Johnson. (R. at 581 p. 
279, Petitioner's Exhibit 34; R. at 581 p. 365-369). Furthermore, the court did not enter 
findings and there is no evidence in the record submitted by the petitioner or the respondent 
17 
that suggests Mr. Johnson's expenses are as low as $40,000.00 per yeaA. *^cause the court 
m a ( j e «ts o w n determination, without sup" -^ of what \ 11 T* >hnsor "s reasonable 
expenses should be and because *! \ the trial 
court abused its discretion cvnit shuuiu u_:efore lemand for a calculation of Mr. 
tcome and reasonable expenses based on the evidence. 
C. Combined lueoim 
Because the parties' combined income was utilized to calculate the parties1 respective 
child support obligations, the court's imputation of income, below an amount Ms lolinson 
is capable of earninp KU am. §78-45-"/ n ) 
(1996) ("The parents' child support obligation shall be divided bet\\*v* 
to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable.") This portion 
ofthe trial court's findings find oid< i J I<l ll adore IK: vacated and remanded for the entry 
of findings that reflect Ms, Johnson's actual income earning abilitn 
support obligations should be adjusted concomitantly 
l i . i* 3* In Awarding Non-terminable Alimony 
The trial court's order reninnm' Mi. Johnson to pay M* '.^lin^n »tip» 
years with the first five years non-terminable, irrespective of her cohabitation, remarriage, 
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or other possible factors is a clear abuse of discretion. In this case, such an award constitutes 
a de facto division of Mr. Johnson's podiatry degree and is therefore impermissible. 
This Court reviews a trial court's alimony award for a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Endrody v. Endrody. supra, (citing Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 
(Utah App. 1994)) ; Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250, 251-52 (Ct.App. 1993). In 
determining alimony, a trial court must consider, at a minimum, the following factors: (1) 
the recipient's financial condition and needs; (2) the recipient spouse's ability to produce 
income; (3) the payor spouse's ability to provide support; and (4) the length of the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (1998); Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah 
App. 1989). If these factors are considered by the trial court, the alimony award will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless "such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah App. 1990). 
The parties were married for thirteen years and the court ordered alimony for a 
minimum period of five years and a maximum period of thirteen years. In awarding alimony, 
the trial court stated: "[Mr. Johnson's] degree and his ability to now support himself as a 
doctor was due to some extent to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. [Mr. 
Johnson] will benefit hereafter until he retires and the Court finds that it is appropriate that 
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Inn HI ii in i i iiiii L nous and sau'iiicca ioi a i Minimum period of five years." 
(R. at 478-79). 
The alimony award here is analogous to the alimony award this Court deemed 
impnimssiMr in Johnson v. Johnson, supra T~ T~Hson, the parties were married for 
twenty-one years, during which tim •. ••* "diiiil MIK»H 1 lie wile, who 
held a bachelor's degree, worked during the four year period that the husband attended 
i in I • i 1 1 however, following the husband's completion of school, the wife ceased to 
work outside of the horn* * janu^ mret enndren. When the 
parties separated, they stipulated to u piopert} division m which - v 1 |i iil'v i • • i\,• I 
$42i"v",l ' i he husband was orduui to pay $2,250 per month in alimony, $250 of which 
was for the purpose of'as*istm|.» lh< ^ I ip|.'jiidnig Iiei employment skills and would 
terminate after four years, while the remaining $2,000 was Non-terminable, 
ordered Non-terminable alimony to assist the wife in support' d to further allow 
the wife to share in the benefi -^lona; .ia; . )n appeal, this Court 
interpreted the order to be an attempt b> the trial court to UIVR 4i 
( j e g r e e a n c | c o n c m a L U i n a l ri A d , ^permissible to award Noti I , • • i ' 'able alimony on a 
finding that one spoil t ^ ' . uenenis of the other spouse's professional 
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degree or license. Such an award is a de facto division of the professional degree or license." 
Icl at 253. See also Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991). 
The refusal by Utah appellate courts to treat professional degrees as property stems 
from the rationale that "[t]he recipient of an advanced degree obtains that degree on the basis 
of his or her innate personal talents, capabilities, and acquired skills and knowledge. Such 
a degree is highly personal to the recipient and has none of the traditional characteristics of 
property." Martinez, supra, at p.541; see also Rayburn v. Rayburn. 738 P.2d 238,240 (Utah 
App. 1987); Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237, 237-42 (Utah App. 1987). The alimony 
award at issue here constitutes an abuse of discretion insofar as it attempts to do that which 
is prohibited: divide Mr. Johnson's professional degree. 
Moreover, Mr. Johnson received no equity in the family home but was ordered to 
maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy, pay half of all day care expenses, provide health 
care insurance for the children, and repay all of the student loan debt, despite the fact that 
such loans contributed substantially to the parties' living expenses during podiatry school. 
Given these facts and considering that the alimony award reflects an attempt to divide Mr. 
Johnson's professional degree, the trial court abused its discretion. For these reasons, and 
because the trial court failed to adequately consider Ms. Johnson's earning ability in 
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awarding alimony, this Court should reverse the alimony award and remand for modification 
and factual findings. 
III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Allocating the Parties' Marital Property 
and Debt 
A. Marital Home 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding all equity in the parties' marital home 
to Ms. Johnson, despite the fact that Mr. Johnson's grandfather provided the down payment 
for the home. Furthermore, the record is deplete of any reason for the court's 
disproportionate award. In making a property distribution, the law presumes that each party 
is entitled to the entirety of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property. See Hall v. Hall supra at p. 1022. To overcome this presumption, unusual 
circumstances justifying an unequal distribution must be memorialized in the court's 
findings. Id 
Despite the fact that the parties had previously agreed that Ms. Johnson would 
continue to live with the children in the marital home and Mr. Johnson would receive an 
equitable lien for one-half of the equity in the home, at trial, Ms. Johnson requested full 
equity in the marital home. (R. at 580 pp. 192-93). Although providing no reason for the 
request on direct examination, on cross examination, Ms. Johnson claimed that she was 
entitled to the equity "[d]ue to the problems that we have incurred going through the 
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separation and the divorce." (R. at 580 p. 242, Ls. 22-23). She also stated that she was 
entitled to the equity because she put Mr. Johnson through undergraduate and medical 
school, although such claims are not supported by the record.2 (R. at 580 p. 242, Ls. 23-25). 
Despite testimony to the contrary and absent a contrary claim by Ms. Johnson, the 
court found that although Mr. Johnson's grandfather had provided the down payment for the 
marital home, the money was a gift to both parties. (R. at 479 Tf 10; R. at 580 p. 219 Ls. 10-
18; R. at 580 pp. 373-74). The court relied upon the same rationale it had provided in its 
alimony award: Mr. Johnson will benefit from his degree until he retires and Ms. Johnson 
should not be denied a concomitant interest for her sacrifices in assisting that endeavor. (R. 
at 479, | 12). This finding is insufficient to justify the award of all equity in the marital 
home to Ms. Johnson and should be reversed and remanded for equitable distribution. 
2
 Ms. Johnson testified that during her undergraduate studies, the parties lived in a house 
owned by Mr. Johnson's grandfather and which they managed and took care of in lieu of paying 
rent and that they received rental income. (R. at 580 p. 74). Ms. Johnson also testified that both 
parties worked while attending school. (R. at 580 p. 75). Although Ms. Johnson did work full-
time while Mr. Johnson was in medical school, between 1987 and 1991, Mr. Johnson took out 
student loans during this period to subsidize the parties' living expenses and received inheritance 
or gift monies which he similarly spent to maintain the parties. In addition, until the separation, 
Ms. Johnson had not worked outside of the home since 1991. From 1991 until the time of the 
parties' separation and divorce, Mr. Johnson was the parties' sole means of support. 
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B. Marital Debt 
The trial court abused its discretion in requiring Mr. Johnson to repay debts where 
Ms. Johnson possesses the property underlying the debt and where Mr. Johnson has been 
ordered to bear the full burden of his student loans. During the period of separation, Mr. 
Johnson attempted to reconcile with Ms. Johnson. In furtherance of this attempt, Mr. 
Johnson purchased a one-carat diamond on a CitiBank Visa Card for $3,502.12, which he 
had placed in Ms. Johnson's original wedding band to replace the existing V2 carat diamond. 
(R. at 580 p. 171, Ls. 14-20; R. at 581 pp.351-52; Plaintiffs Exhibit 46). The jewelry store 
has agreed to take the diamond back and try to find a diamond comparable to the original 
diamond that Mr. Johnson exchanged for the one carat diamond. (R. at 581 pp. 352, Ls. 11-
23). 
Despite the store's amenability to taking the diamond back, the trial court did not 
order Ms. Johnson to return the ring but the court did order that Mr. Johnson repay the debt. 
Given that neither party has any interest in possessing the ring and given that the store has 
offered to take the diamond back, the trial court should have ordered, at a minimum, that Ms. 
Johnson return the diamond to the store of purchase and exchange it for a diamond 
comparable to her original diamond. Such an exchange would eliminate a majority of the 
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underlying debt on the CitiBank Visa Card and would provide Ms. Johnson with a ring 
similar to the ring she had prior to the exchange. Such an order would have been proper, 
given that Ms. Johnson has no interest in the ring and is essentially interested only in the 
credit card balance being paid off. (R. at 580 p. 242, Ls. 12-19). Exchanging the ring would 
substantially eliminate the credit card debt in a quick and efficient manner, and would satisfy 
both parties. The court's failure to order Ms. Johnson to return the ring constitutes an abuse 
of discretion and this Court should reverse the court's order for reconsideration on remand. 
IV. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Requiring Mr. Johnson to Pay Day 
Care Expenses While Ms. Johnson Seeks an Additional Advanced Degree 
The trial court's order requiring Mr. Johnson to reimburse Ms. Johnson for day care 
expenses she incurs while seeking a second advanced degree constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.17 (1996) provides that child care costs "may be 
awarded on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational training 
of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the interest of justice." 
Ms. Johnson earned an English degree from Brigham Young University in 1987 and, 
in that same year, obtained a teaching certificate. (R. at 580 p. 75, Ls. 8-12). Following 
the parties' separation in October of 1996, Ms. Johnson worked as a substitute teacher three 
to four days in 1996 and approximately thirty days in 1997; however, she did not seriously 
consider re-certifying her teaching credentials until June of 1997. (R. at 580 p. 113, Ls. 14-
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15; R.at 580 pp. 234-35). Although the vocational evaluator who testified on Ms. Johnson's 
behalf at the trial indicated that there are few jobs teaching English, she did not indicate if 
her conclusion was based on the Davis County area or if that generalized conclusion applied 
to the Salt Lake County school district as well. (R.at 582, p. 404, Ls. 1-3). In addition, the 
evaluator did not review Ms. Johnson's earning potential in the medical or podiatry field, 
an area in which she is highly qualified to work as an office manager and a field in which 
she earned a starting salary which was much higher than she would have received as a 
teacher. (R. at 581 pp. 410-11; R. at 580 p. 97, Ls. 19-22). 
There was no evidence presented to indicate that Ms. Johnson will need an additional 
degree in order to support herself. The only evidence presented consists of Ms. Johnson's 
witness who testified that English teaching jobs in the Davis County school district are not 
abundant; however, this has not precluded Ms. Johnson from obtaining work as a substitute 
teacher and in fact, she has turned down employment. (R. at 580 pp. 237-38). Although it 
is Ms. Johnson's desire to obtain a business degree, a business degree is not necessary for 
her self-sufficiency. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that such a degree would improve Ms. 
Johnson's earnings or ability to become self-sufficient. Given this fact, Mr. Johnson should 
not be required to subsidize Ms. Johnson's desire to obtain an additional degree that will 
confer no additional benefits. There is simply no evidence that the additional degree sought 
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by Ms. Johnson is anything more than a want rather than a need, (R. at 581 pp. 402-04). 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Mr. Johnson to pay half of all day care 
expenses incurred while Ms. Johnson obtains an additional degree and this Court should 
reverse and remand for the trial court to modify the order. 
V. The Trial Abused its Discretion in Denying Mr. Johnson the right to claim all of 
the Parties' Children as Tax Exemptions 
Absent any indication that Ms. Johnson will gain a tax benefit from the court's award 
of tax exemptions for two of the parties' children, the trial court erred in awarding Ms. 
Johnson these exemptions while only awarding Mr. Johnson one exemption. When a trial 
court or administrative agency awards tax exemptions, it must consider first and foremost 
the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the children, and secondly, the 
relative tax benefit to each parent. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.21 (1996). A court or 
administrative agency is precluded from awarding an exemption to a parent unless the 
exemption will result in a tax benefit to that parent.3 Because Mr. Johnson would clearly 
benefit from the ability to claim all of the children as tax exemptions and because Ms. 
Johnson neither demonstrated nor asserted any tax benefit from the exemptions, the trial 
3
 Utah Code Ann §78-45-7 21(3) (1993) further provides that a court or administrative 
agency may not award any exemption to a noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his 
child support obligations Although Ms Johnson has alleged that Mr Johnson is not current in 
his child support obligation, Mr Johnson emphasizes that although he is not current on his 
alimony payments, he is current with respect to his child support payments 
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court abused its discretion in awarding two exemptions to Ms. Johnson and only one to Mr. 
Johnson. This is especially so given the parties' incomes and the fact that Mr. Johnson was 
not given the option of purchasing the exemptions from Ms. Johnson. See Hill v. HilL 
supra, (upholding trial court's award of five exemptions to mother where father was allowed 
to purchase the exemptions from the mother and the mother had limited financial resources 
and potential). 
At a minimum, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Ms. Johnson the right 
to claim two of the children as tax exemptions without first determining that she would 
receive a tax benefit from the exemptions. Because Mr. Johnson would clearly receive a 
greater benefit from the right to claim all children as tax exemptions, the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to award him the exemptions. When this is viewed with the relative 
support obligations of each party it is readily apparent that Mr. Johnson is providing the 
"lion's share" of monetary support for the children. He should have been awarded all of the 
children for tax purposes. 
VI. The Trial Court Erred in Declining to Require Ms. Johnson to Reimburse or 
Otherwise Compensate Mr. Johnson for his $89,000 Inheritance 
The trial court erred in failing to account for the inheritance Mr. Johnson received in 
1996 in dividing the parties' marital assets. In its findings, the court notes that in 1996, Mr. 
Johnson received an $89,000.00 inheritance. (R. at 477). However, the court also 
28 
determined that Mr. Johnson was delinquent in his alimony and child support through 
January 1998 in the amount of $13,350 and entered a judgment in that amount against him. 
(R. at 481). The court did not attempt to offset the delinquency against Mr. Johnson's 
inheritance which was wrongfully appropriated by Ms. Johnson. 
In making a property distribution, the law presumes that each party is entitled to the 
entirety of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. See Hall v. 
HaU, supra, at p. 1022. To overcome this presumption, unusual circumstances justifying an 
unequal distribution must be memorialized in the court's findings. Id. 
The parties testified that Mr. Johnson received an $89,000.00 inheritance from his 
mother's estate and from his grandfather in 1996. (R. at 580 pp. 135-36). Ms. Johnson 
testified that she utilized a some of the inheritance money to pay off the parties' credit card 
bills. ( R. at 580 pp. 222-23; R. at 581 pp. 346-47). How much and to whom was never 
explained. Because both parties testified that this inheritance was Mr. Johnson's and was 
not a gift to both parties, the court erred in failing to either require Ms. Johnson to reimburse 
Mr. Johnson for those portions of his separate property which were used to pay community 
debt or to offset the amount owed to him by Ms. Johnson against his outstanding alimony 
debt. This Court should reverse and remand to permit the court to account for Mr. Johnson's 
inheritance in the property distribution or otherwise. 
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VII. The Court's Order that Mr. Johnson Provide Health and Accident Insurance for 
the Benefit of the Children is Contrary to Law and Constitutes an Abuse of 
Discretion. 
The court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Johnson to maintain health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the children. Utah Code Annotated, §78-45-7.15(3) 
provides "[t]he order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.15(3). The statute is clearly mandatory. Nonetheless the trial court ordered Mr. 
Johnson solely to maintain health and accident insurance for the benefit of the children and 
thereby abused its discretion. 
Indeed, the record is clear that Mr. Johnson has to pay a premium for health and 
accident insurance in the amount of $350 per month. (R. at 364). Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7.15(4) Mr. Johnson is required to pay $ 131.25 of the monthly premium. (This 
amount is taken by dividing the premium of $350 by 4 persons, multiplying that figure by 
the 3 children and then dividing that figure by the 2 parents). The court abused its discretion 
because, contrary to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(3), it did not order Ms. Johnson to pay her 
share of the premium paid by Mr. Johnson for health and accident insurance coverage for the 
children. 
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VIII. The Trial Court Erred in Ordering Mr. Johnson to Pay Ms. Johnson's Attorney 
Fees 
The trial court erred in awarding Ms. Johnson $20,000.00 in attorney fees after 
concluding that she does not have the ability to pay such fees given her limited income and 
resources. (R. at 481-82). Attorney fees may be awarded in an action to establish an order 
of custody, visitation, child support, alimony and/or the division of property in a domestic 
case. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(1) (1998). In ordering attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3(1), the trial court must base its award on evidence of the receiving spouse's 
financial need, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fee 
requested. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516-17 (Utah App. 1996); Hill v. Hill 869 
P.2d 963, 967 (Utah App. 1994); Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). 
In determining reasonable attorney fees the factors that should be considered include 
but are not limited to the following: (1) the complexity or difficulty of the litigation; (2) the 
attorneys' efficiency in presenting the case; (3) the reasonable number of hours spent on the 
case; (4) the customary fee in the locality for similar services; (5) the amount involved in the 
case; (6) the result obtained; and (7) the experience and expertise of the attorneys involved. 
Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226, 232 (Utah 1997). 
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Here, Ms. Johnson requested attorney fees in the amount of $34,000.00. (R. at 581 
p. 415). However, the court only awarded $20,000.00, but offered no explanation for the 
award. (R. at 481-82). The court simply stated that Ms. Johnson was unable to pay her own 
attorney fees and had limited income and resources. (R. at 481). The court did not consider 
whether Mr. Johnson had the ability to pay and the court clearly did not find that $34,000.00 
was a reasonable fee as it only awarded $20,000.00. However, the court did not explain how 
it arrived at the $20,000.00 figure or whether and how this represents a reasonable fee. For 
these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand to the trial court for a determination of 
reasonable attorney fees and Mr. Johnson's ability to pay. See, e.g.. Bell supra, at p.494 
("To permit meaningful review of the trial court's ruling, 'we have consistently encouraged 
trial courts to make findings to explain factors which they considered relevant in arriving at 
an attorney fee award,"') (quoting Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 748 P.2d 1210, 
1214 (Utah App. 1989)); Marshall supra, at p.516-17 ("The failure to consider any of the 
enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee issue."). 
CONCLUSION 
This court should remand this case for several abuses of the trial court's discretion. 
Specifically, the trial court's calculation of the income of the parties is erroneous. The trial 
court did not impute sufficient income to Ms. Johnson who has a college degree and teaching 
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certificate. The court imputed a mere $1000.00 per month to Ms. Johnson although it was 
established that Ms. Johnson made significantly more than that in the medical office 
management field. Ms. Johnson's own expert testified that Ms. Johnson was capable of 
earning at least $17,635.00 per year. 
Mr. Johnson's income was also erroneously calculated by the trial court. The trial 
court took an average of Mr. Johnson's deposits into his accounts as an indicator of his 
income although the evidence was uncontroverted that Mr. Johnson's deposited large sums 
of money that he had received as gifts from his grandfather and others. There were also 
transfers back and froth from the accounts which would not conelate into income. Further 
the court did not understand the financial exhibits presented by Mr. Johnson. The court 
erroneously concluded that there were discrepancies between Mr. Johnson's 1099 Forms for 
miscellaneous income and his federal tax returns. However, the court mistook the 1099 
forms from 1996 as coming from 1997. As a result, the court mistakenly thought there was 
a discrepancy when in fact the amounts in the 1996, 1099 forms and the amount reported in 
Schedule C of Mr. Johnson's 1996 federal tax return are equivalent. 
The trial court further failed to address Mr. Johnson's ability to pay. The evidence 
clearly showed that Mr. Johnson had taken out over $120,000.00 in student loans and that 
two of the loans are due in full. Mr. Johnson showed, and the petitioner did not rebut, the 
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fact that if Mr. Johnson does not pay his student loans he will not qualify as a Medicare 
provider and will lose the source of 95% of his income. The court completely failed to 
consider the fact the Mr. Johnson must pay off his student loans in order to make an income. 
Mr. Johnson's reasonable business expenses were stated by the court as being 
$40,000.00 per year. However, the court made no findings whatsoever to support its' 
calculation. Indeed, the evidence shows that Mr. Johnson's reasonable business expenses are 
$7440.00 per month, $89,280.00 per year. It is simply unreasonable for the court to have 
come up with an amount of $40,000 per year without any findings or evidence in support of 
this amount. The court's calculation of the parties income was then used to determine the 
parties' child support obligations and Mr. Johnson's alimony obligation. As a result both the 
child support obligations and the Mr. Johnson's alimony obligations are clearly in error. 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding non-terminable alimony to Ms. 
Johnson regardless of whether she remarries, cohabitates or whether any other number of 
factors occur. The court's alimony award is contrary to Utah law which prohibits a court 
from dividing the value of a professional degree as if it were marital property. 
The failure of the trial court to award any equity in the marital home to Mr. Johnson 
also constitutes an abuse of discretion and extreme inequity. This is especially so, given that 
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Mr. Johnson's grandfather paid the down payment for the home. The court failed to make 
sufficient findings to support its inequitable decision. 
Ordering Mr. Johnson to pay off marital debt for property that is in the possession of 
Ms. Johnson was also an abuse of discretion. Ms. Johnson has in her possession a diamond 
ring that was purchased with a credit card and the court ordered Mr. Johnson to pay the debt 
and allowed Ms. Johnson to retain the property. Ms. Johnson has no interest in keeping the 
ring and the retailer agreed to take the ring back but Ms. Johnson refused. The court 
nonetheless concluded that Mr. Johnson should have to pay this debt. This is an abuse of 
discretion. 
The trial court erred in requiring Mr. Johnson to pay one-half of day care expenses 
for the children while she seeks a second advanced degree. Ms. Johnson already has an 
advanced degree and could be working. Ms. Johnson is qualified to work as a teacher and 
would be able to keep the same hours as her children. Day care is therefore unnecessary and 
Mr. Johnson should not be required to pay these expenses. 
By denying Mr. Johnson the right to claim all of the parties' children as exemption 
for tax purposes constitutes an abuse of discretion. The court awarded Ms. Johnson the right 
to claim all three children as dependents although she receives no economic advantage by 
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claiming the children. The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that Mr. Johnson was the 
only party who could have benefitted from the right to claim the children as tax exemptions. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by not ordering Ms. Johnson to reimburse 
Mr. Johnson for $89,000.00 that he received as an inheritance. Ms. Johnson squandered this 
money for her own purposes and should be required to repay Mr. Johnson for this money. 
Ms. Johnson, herself testified that this money was given to Mr. Johnson and that she had no 
rights in it. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to require Mr. Johnson to maintain a 
health and accident insurance policy for the benefit of the children without contribution or 
reimbursement from Ms. Johnson. Mr. Johnson is self-employed and must pay for his own 
insurance. Not to require Ms. Johnson to pay one half of the premium contradicts Utah law 
and is an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, the trial court erred in ordering Mr. Johnson to pay Ms. Johnson $20,000.00 
in attorneys fees. The court did not enter any findings as to how it determined that 
$20,000.00 was a reasonable fee. It is clear however, that the court did not think that the 
$34,000.00 claimed by the petitioner was reasonable because the court merely awarded 
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$20,000.00. To make this conclusion without supporting evidence or adequate findings 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
DATED this t \ day of January, 1999. 
)Y S.^ LUDLpW 
Attorney forRelpondent/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
39 
209 DIVORCE 30-3-1 
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided by law 
for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the 
petitioner and respondent on the grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all 
cases where the petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of this state and of the county where the action is brought, or if 
members of the armed forces of the United States who are not legal residents 
of this state, where the petitioner has been stationed in this state under 
military orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of the 
action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent to marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent for more than 
one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the petitioner the 
common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent to the extent of 
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of 
separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years without 
cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does not affect the 
liability of either party under any provision for separate maintenance previ-
ously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the appropriate 
authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the 
action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the respondent is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian ad litem who 
shall protect the interests of the respondent. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon his 
guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the 
action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of the case and if 
the respondent resides out of this state, take depositions as necessary, 
attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is just to protect the rights 
of the respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment 
of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance 
of minor children, as the courts and judges possess in other actions for 
divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent resides in this 
state, upon notice, have the respondent brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the respondent by two or more competent 
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physicians, to determine the mental condition of the respondent. For this 
purpose either party may have leave from the court to enter any asylum or 
institution where the respondent may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 
History: R-S. 1898, § 1208; L. 1903, ch. 43, Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1208; C.L. 1917, § 2995; L. ment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "peti-
1929, ch. 93, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,40-3-1; tioner" for "plaintiff" and "respondent" for "de-
L. 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1955, ch. 45, § 1; 1965, fendant" throughout the section. 
ch. 57, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 1; 1987, ch. 106, 
§ 1; 1997, ch. 47, § 1. 
30-3*2. Right of husband to divorce. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995). 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ume. See Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
—Need. 
Although trial court concluded that plain-
tiff's attorney fees were "necessary," there was 
no finding regarding plaintiff's need for an 
award of attorney fees, therefore, the trial 
court's findings and conclusions were insuffi-
cient to allow meaningful review by the appel-
late court. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit 
— Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner or 
petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered 
upon the default of the respondent, evidence to support the decree may be 
submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the 
court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or children, a 
decree of divorce may not be granted until both parties have attended the 
mandatory course described in Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a 
certificate of course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it 
determines course attendance and completion are not necessary, appro-
priate, feasible, or in the best interest of the parties. 
Compiler's Notes. — In 1997, the Utah 
legislature changed the designation of parties 
in domestic relations cases from "plaintiff" and 
"defendant" to "petitioner" and "respondent." 
Annotations from decisions before the amend-
ments will not reflect these changes in termi-
nology. 
ANALYSIS 
Attorney fees. 
—Need. 
Attorney fees. 
In accord with last paragraph in bound vol-
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(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
ofi&ce of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole* for 
"Board of Pardons* in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final order. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
— Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as 
(2)(d) to (2)(j). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,39-6-16. 
Extraordinary writs . 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. Murphy, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition originally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard 
v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulate* 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history. 
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occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week, lb impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, 1996, added "40-hour" and the second sentence 
ch. 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1. in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
(5Xb). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses. 
Findings by court. 
Imputed income. 
Modification of award. 
Second job. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of law under this section; the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary, and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business's opera-
tion at a reasonable level. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The trial court acted within its discretion in 
}ot deducting as "necessary expenses required 
or self-employment of business operation" the 
father's small business taxes and his student 
loan obligations in calculating his gross income. 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Findings by court. 
Although a trial court entered findings re-
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter any findings required under 
Subsection (7Xa), the findings on the whole 
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
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determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
^listory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. § 1; 1997, ch. 174, § 68; 1997, ch. 375, § 322. 
1*189, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ch. 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1; 1997, ch. 29, ment by ch. 29, effective May 5, 1997, substi-
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(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change in circum-
stances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent 
for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a 
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine 
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the 
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not 
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support 
ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6) 
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after 
July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, merit, effective July 1,1997 rewrote Subsection 
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, ch. 232, (6) and added Subsections (7) and (8). 
§ 72. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disabil-
ity Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
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78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in 
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is 
applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in 
Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is 
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as 
follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obli-
gation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of 
the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount 
calculated using the low income table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined 
child support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children, 
additional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown. 
Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be 
less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the 
court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support 
obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award shall not 
be less than $20. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total 
number of children, not an amount per child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.7, enacted by L. tion of any monthly payments made directly by 
1989, ch. 214, § 9; 1990, ch. 100, § 6; 1994, each parent for medical and dental insurance 
ch. 118, § 8. premiums" at the end of Subsection (2)(b); de-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- leted former Subsections (2)(c) and (2)(d) relat-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added "unless the ing to the calculation of the child support 
low income table is applicable" at the end of award; added present Subsections (3) and (5) 
Subsection (1); inserted "and in cases where the and redesignated the subsections accordingly; 
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less
 m present Subsection (4), substituted "six chil-
monthly" and substituted "base" for "total" in dren" for "ten children" in two places, substi-
the introductory language of Subsection (2);
 t u t e d «may» for "shall" in the second sentence 
inserted "combined" the second time the word
 a n d a d d e d t h e t h i r d sentence; and made stylis-
appears in Subsection (2)(a); deleted "and sub-
 t^c changes, 
tracting from the products the children's por-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS parent may be credited for insurance premiums 
ADDlicflhilitv P a i d b v t h e c h i l d r e n , s stepparent. Ball v. 
Cited Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Applicability. Cited in Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 
This section does not address whether a C t*A p p* 1992)* 
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Gross Income 
From 
701 
726 
751 
776 
801 
826 
851 
876 
901 
926 
951 
976 
1,001 
^ 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
To 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1,000 
1,050 
1 
68 
90 
113 
2 
68 
91 
114 
137 
159 
182 
205 
228 
250 
Number of Children 
3 
69 
92 
115 
138 
161 
184 
207 
230 
253 
276 
299 
4 
70 
93 
116 
140 
163 
186 
209 
233 
256 
279 
302 
326 
372 
78-45-7.15 
5 
71 
94 
118 
141 
165 
188 
212 
235 
259 
282 
306 
329 
376 
6 
71 
95 
119 
143 
166 
190 
214 
238 
261 
285 
309 
333 
380 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.14, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 118, § 15. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1994, ch. 118, § 15 repeals former § 78-45-
7.14, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100, 
§ 10, containing the "Base Combined Child 
Support Obligation Table," and enacts the 
present section, effective July 1, 1994. 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the 
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for 
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket 
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of 
insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the 
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the 
instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
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601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent 
fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7). 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L. the present section, effective July 1, 1994 
1994, ch. 118, § 16; 1995, ch. 258, § 14. Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
 m e n t , effective May 1, 1995, deleted "and actu-
1994, ch 118, § 16 repeals former § 78-45- ally paid by the parents" after "children" at the 
7 15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch 100,
 end of Subsection (5) § 11, relating to medical expenses, and enacts 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the 
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin 
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be 
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of 
the child support order. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who 
incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall 
notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the 
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of 
the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent 
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.16, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 118, § 17. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this sec-
tion which read "(1) The monthly amount to be 
paid for reasonable work related child care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the depen-
dent children of the parents shall be specified 
as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
"(2) If an actual expense included in an 
amount specified m the order ceases to be 
incurred, the obligor may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense while itui not 
being incurred, without obtaining a modifica-
tion of the child support order " 
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78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is 
presumed, if the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, during extended 
visitation, is working and actually incurring the child care costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded 
on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational 
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the 
interest of justice. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L. tion" in Subsection (1); added "or if otherwise 
1989, ch. 214, § 19; 1994, ch. 118, § 18. ordered by the court in the interest of justice" at 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- the end of Subsection (2); and made stylistic 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or the changes, 
noncustodial parent, during extended visita-
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be 
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table, using the low 
income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2). 
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in 
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's 
adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support 
would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption 
under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.18, enacted by L. stituted "If amounts under either table as pro-
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13; 1994, vided in Section 78-45-7.14 in combination with 
ch. 118, § 19. the award of medical expenses" for "If the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- combination of the two amounts under Subsec-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "using tion (1)" at the beginning of Subsection (2); and 
the low income table, or awarding" for "or for made stylistic changes, 
the award of uninsured" in Subsection (1); sub-
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability. 
(1) The district court or administrative agency may issue an order deter-
mining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent 
child when the parent: 
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to: 
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent 
child; or 
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails to do so; or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage 
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued. 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what propor-
tions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the 
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary. 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or ad-
1990, ch. 166, § 4; 1994, ch. 118, § 20. ministrative agency" and substituted "medical 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- expenses" for "uninsured medical, hospital, and 
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dental expenses" in the introductory language dental care insurance" in Subsection (lXaXii)-
of Subsection (1); substituted "insurance for and made a stylistic change, 
medical expenses" for "medical, hospital, or 
78-45-7.20. Accountability of support provided to benefit 
child — Accounting. 
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified 
order for child support may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively 
the obligee to furnish an accounting of amounts provided for the child's benefit 
to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts. 
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the 
form of the accounting which shall include receipts and an accounting. 
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if current on all child 
support that has been ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.20, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23 
1994, ch. 118, § 21. makes the act effective on July 1, 1994. 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to 
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or 
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall 
consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the 
cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not 
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administra-
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23 
1994, ch. 118, § 22. makes the act effective on July 1,1994. 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, 
Defendant, 
RULING 
Case No. 964701989 
JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
This matter came before the court for trial on February 6, 1998 and was taken 
under advisement to allow the Defendant to provide Form 1099s for the calendar year 1997. 
The Court had these documents faxed to it on March 3, 1998. The Court having considered 
the testimony of the parties and the evidence presented at the time of trial and on March 3, 
1998, now enters the following findings and.order: 
1. Both parties were residents of Davis County at least three months prior to the 
filing of the complaint and service of process was accomplished pursuant to the law. This 
court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this case. 
2. The parties were married on June 22, 1984 and have remained husband and 
wife to the present. The parties have experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will 
award a decree of divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The following are minor children born of this marriage: Heather Erinne, born 
Nov. 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. 
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The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner should exercise the primary physical care of the 
minor children and the Court will enter an order to that effect. The Respondent petitions the 
Court for joint legal custody of the minor children. The Court finds that it is not in the best 
interest of these children to have joint legal custody in the parties. The parties have not 
demonstrated the ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in the best 
interest of the minor children. However, the Respondent is entitled to all of the statutory 
benefits of being a noncustodial parent and the Court will direct counsel for the Petitioner to 
incorporate into the decree of divorce all of those statutory benefits and rights. 
4. The Respondent is entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with the minor 
children and the Court will order that at a minimum he should receive the standard rights of 
visitation as set forth in the statute. Even though the minor child Kevyn is not quite three 
years old, the Court will order that the Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as 
he does the older children and that is the standard visitation for children over five. All of the 
statutory rights and responsibilities pertaining to visitation shall be set forth in the decree. 
5. The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-half of the actually incurred 
day care expenses when the custodial parent is working. Those expenses must be reasonable 
as compared to day care services generally. The noncustodial parent is entitled pursuant to the 
statute to provide day care if he is available on a regular basis to do so. If the Petitioner 
pursues her education to get a teaching certificate, the Respondent is ordered to reimburse one 
half of the day care which is incurred as a result of her taking college courses. 
6. The Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a private school. The Court 
finds that there will not be excess resources on either side and that private school is a luxury 
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and not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will not order the noncustodial 
parent to be responsible for one half of any private school tuition or books. If the Petitioner 
determines to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the knowledge that she 
would be paying all of the costs. 
7. The Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children. The Court having considered the financial circumstances and 
abilities of the parties relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that the 
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be entitled to any 
offset against child support for that premium. However, the parties will each be responsible 
for one half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. Counsel for 
Petitioner is directed to put in the decree the statutory language regarding the reimbursement 
of medical expenses. 
8. The Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance policy of a minimum of 
$100, 000.00, with the minor children named as beneficiaries. In the event of the 
Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor 
children. 
9. The Court has the obligation to determine the Respondent's income in this case. 
Evidence was presented to show that during 1995 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU 
account $143,124.18. However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C that his gross 
receipts were $80,677. For the calendar year 1996 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU 
account $137,606.98. (This figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and 
subtracting $89,000 inheritance he received that year). During the trial the Respondent 
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provided the Court with Exhibit 3 which contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which 
showed deposits of $124,415.69. In addition to that, the Court received as evidence 
Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that year he reports gross 
receipts of $97,549. For calendar year 1997 the Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his 
total earning deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21. However, he has provided the Court with 
the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total income of $94,471.35. The Court notes 
there are discrepancies in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his 
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits for 1995 and 1996. The 
Court finds that the Respondent is not being forthright and honest in his representation of what 
his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Court is going to calculate the 
Respondent's income by the following method. The Court will take the average of the 1995 
deposit of $143,124 and the 1996 deposits of $137,606 and the Respondent's representation of 
his 1997 deposits of $105, 314. The average of those three years the Court calculates being 
$128,681. Now, the Respondent is entitled to reasonable expenses to operate his business. 
The Court having examined the expenses of the Respondent as he has related them on his tax 
return and having considered his testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his 
expenses in the tax returns. The Court will find that reasonable expenses for the Respondent 
are $40,000 per year. Taking the imputed gross receipts of $128, 681 less the $40,000 
expenses, the Court finds that the Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child 
support and alimony is $88,681 or $7390 per month. 
10. The Petitioner is entitled to receive and the Respondent is ordered to pay child 
support pursuant to the guidelines using an income for Respondent of $7390 and imputing to 
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the Petitioner $1000 per month. The Court imputes income to the Petitioner because she has a 
Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the ability to work and to earn 
income of at least $1000 per month. Using the guidelines, the Court finds that child support 
would be $1482 per month. The Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the 
month of February 1998. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare a child support 
worksheet using the figures of $7390 for the Respondent and $1000 for the Petitioner and the 
resulting number if it should be different from the calculation of the Court would be the 
amount ordered for child support. 
11. The Petitioner has reasonable minimum expenses in the amount of $4000 per 
month. The Court finds she has the ability to make $1000 per month which would calculate to 
approximately $750 in net income that she can generate on her own. That leaves expenses to 
be covered of $3250. She has a child support award of $1482 per month which would leave 
the amount of $1768 in expenses that would not be covered by her income or child support. 
The Petitioner has a need for alimony. The Respondent has a gross monthly income for 
purposes of calculating alimony of $7390 per month. After taxes, the Court finds that he has a 
net income of approximately $5500 and reasonable expenses of $2500 per month. This leaves 
the Respondent with the ability to pay approximately $3000 per month toward child support 
and alimony. He is ordered to pay $1482 per month in child support, which leaves $1518 
which he has the ability to pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony. Based on the need of the 
Petitioner and the ability of the Respondent to pay, the Court will order that Respondent pay to 
Petitioner $1518 per month in alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13 
years. The Court finds that the Petitioner has made significant sacrifice during the term of the 
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marriage as the Respondent has pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training. The 
Respondent's degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due to some extent 
to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. The Respondent will benefit hereafter until 
he retires and the Court finds that it is appropriate that the Petitioner benefit from her efforts 
and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years. The Court will term this minimum period 
of alimony as reimbursement alimony. Alimony shall terminate after five years upon the 
remarriage or cohabitation of the Petitioner. 
12. In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate in this case to likewise make 
a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property. The parties have acquired a home 
in Layton, Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300 and a mortgage balance of $91,258. 
The equity of the parties in that real property is $27,042. The Court finds it equitable to 
award Petitioner the marital home, and the entire equity in the home. The Court 
acknowledges that $6000 came from Respondent's grandfather and was used as the down 
payment for the purchase of the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6000 
to have been a gift to both parties. The Petitioner will be responsible for paying the mortgage 
payment and hold the Respondent harmless in the event of her nonpayment. 
13. The parties have acquired certain personal property during the term of the 
marriage. The Court will award the property that is currently in the possession of each party 
to that party except as hereafter noted. The Court finds that the Petitioner has certain items of 
personal property that are the Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the 
Respondent as soon as possible. Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique 
hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and wagon. In addition, the 
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Petitioner is to give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied. The Court notes 
that Respondent may have real property that was gifted to him and will order that the 
Petitioner have no interest in any real property that he may own separately. The Court awards 
to the Petitioner her automobile and to the Respondent his two automobiles. 
14. The parties have acquired certain debts and obligations during the term of 
their marriage. The Court will order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. In addition, the Court will order that the Respondent be 
responsible for his student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
15. Each party will be responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns 
for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and 
the oldest child to the Petitioner and will award the exemption for the middle child to the 
Respondent. 
16. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party 
interfering with the credit or accounts of the other party. 
17. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party 
harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other except for purposes of 
exercising visitation. 
18. The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in his alimony and child 
support obligation through the month of January 1997 in the amount of $13,350. The Court 
will enter a judgment against the Respondent on behalf of the Petitioner in that amount. The 
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the ability to pay each and every 
month and that is why the arrearage. The Court finds that during the period that the 
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Respondent was ordered to pay that he purchased two automobiles of which he only needed 
one and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary. The Court will find that he 
had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully 
violated the order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt. The Court will order 
that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on condition that 
he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future. In addition, the Court will award some 
attorney's fees that will be calculated later. 
19. The Petitioner had an ongoing responsibility to provide the Respondent with 
visitation with the minor children. The Court finds that the Petitioner wilfully violated the 
order of the Court in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will find her in 
contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in the Davis County Jail. The Court will 
suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future. 
20. The parties each have had to incur substantial attorneys' fees in this matter to 
get the case to trial. The Court will find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that the Petitioner, with her limited income and resources, 
does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees. The Court will find that reasonable 
attorney's fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular case is $20,000. 
The Court finds that while Petitioner does not have the ability to pay these fees that the 
Respondent does have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will enter a 
judgment against him on behalf of the Petitioner in the amount of $20,000 for attorney's fees. 
21. It is the understanding of the Court that neither party has any retirement 
benefits and thus there would be nothing to share pursuant to Woodward. 
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22. Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the execution of any documents 
necessary to finalize this order, or for property distribution, custody, visitation, and child 
support under the terms of this divorce decree. 
23. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare an order consistent with this 
ruling. 
Dated this 26th day of March 1998 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALKPHIN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the attached RULING was mailed by First Class postage to the 
individuals listed below on . 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
311 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful UT 84010 
BY THE COURT, 
Deputy Clerk 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #2331 
Attorney for Petitioner 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
Fax: (801) 298-8950 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE JOHNSON, ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 964701989DA 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, ) 
Respondent. ) JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February, 
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding. 
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen, 
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and 
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record. 
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and now 
being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both parties are residents of Davis County at least 
three (3) months prior to the filing of the Complaint and service 
of process was accomplished pursuant to the law. The Court finds 
that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of 
the case. 
2. The parties were married on June 22, 1984, and have 
remained husband and wife to the present. The parties have 
experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will award a 
Decree of Divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The following are minor children born of this 
marriage: Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, 
born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. The 
parties have stipulated that Petitioner should exercise the primary 
physical care of the minor children and the Court will enter an 
order to that effect. Respondent petitions the Court for joint 
legal custody of the minor children. The Court finds that it is 
not in the best interest of these children to have joint legal 
custody in the parties. The parties have not demonstrated the 
ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in 
the best interest of the minor children. However, pursuant to § 
30-3-33 Utah Code Annotated, Respondent is entitled to all 
statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial parent, which 
shall include the following: 
a. Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports 
and community functions in which the children are participating or 
being honored, and Respondent shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; 
b. Respondent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and day care reports and medical 
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent 
in the event of a medical emergency; 
c. Each parent shall provide the other with their 
current address and telephone number at this time and within 24 
hours of any change; 
d. Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail 
privileges with the children; 
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e. Parental care shall be presumed to be better 
care for the children than surrogate care and the Court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing Respondent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
f. Each parent shall provide all surrogate care 
providers with the name, current address, and telephone number of 
the other parent and shall provide each other with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care 
providers unless the Court for good cause orders otherwise; 
4. Respondent is entitled to reasonable rights of 
visitation with the minor children and the Court will order that at 
a minimum he should receive the standard rights of visitation as 
set forth in the statute. Even though the minor child Kevyn is not 
quite three years old, the Court will order that Respondent have 
the same visitation rights with her as he does the older children 
and that is the standard visitation for children over five. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation shall be as 
follows: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m.; 
(b) Alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled 
school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for 
the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
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(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday 
or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that 
time so that the child is free from school and the parent is 
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to 
this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or 
after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school 
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as 
the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
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(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for 
the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, 
commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas 
school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
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(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial 
parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option 
of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject 
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical 
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, 
the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours 
and for reasonable duration. 
5. The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-
half of the actually incurred day care expenses when the custodial 
parent is working. Those expenses must be reasonable as compared 
to day care services generally. The non-custodial parent is 
entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day care if he is 
available on a regular basis to do so. If Petitioner pursues her 
education to get a teaching certificate in an area other than 
English or to obtain another degree requiring similar schooling, 
Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the day care which 
is incurred as a result thereof.— Gr*<«* /f^^ /^(KT^^t^^ sfaf*-e A&><*&ZJP 
kUet^ o&t^, 1%*^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 . 
\\ 
6. Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a 
private school. The Court finds that there will not be excess 
resources on either side and that private school is a luxury and 
not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will 
not order the non-custodial parent to be responsible for one-half 
of any private school tuition or books. If Petitioner determines 
to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the 
knowledge that she would be paying all of those costs. 
7. Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children. The Court having 
considered the financial circumstances and abilities of the parties 
relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that 
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he 
will not be entitled to any offset against child support for that 
premium. However, the parties will each be responsible for one-
half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. 
Pursuant to § 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be 
ordered to provide written notification of the cost and payment of 
medical expenses to Respondent within 3 0 days of payment. 
Respondent should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his one-
half of those expenses within 15 days after receiving notification. 
8. Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance 
policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor children named 
as exclusive beneficiaries. In the event of the Respondent's death 
the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor 
children. Respondent is ordered to provide proof of maintenance of 
such insurance to Petitioner. 
9. The Court has the obligation to determine 
Respondent's income in this case. Evidence was presented to show 
that during 1995 Respondent deposited in his VAMCU account 
$143,124.18. However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C 
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that his gross receipts were $80,677.00. For the calendar year 
1996 Respondent deposited in his VAMCU account $13 7,606.98. (This 
figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and 
subtracting $89,000.00 inheritance he received that year). During 
the trial Respondent provided the Court with Exhibit 3 which 
contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which showed deposits of 
$124,415.69. In addition to that, the Court received as evidence 
Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that 
year he reports gross receipts of $97,549.00. For calendar year 
1997 Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his total earning 
deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21. However, he has provided the 
Court with the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total 
income of $94,471.35. The Court notes there are discrepancies in 
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his 
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits 
for 1995 and 1996. The Court finds that Respondent is not being 
forthright and honest in his representation of what his income has 
been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Court is going to 
calculate the Respondent's income by the following method. The 
Court will take the average of the 1995 deposit of $143,124.00 and 
the 1996 deposits of $137,606.00 and the Respondent's 
representation of his 1997 deposits of $105,314.00. The average of 
those three years the Court calculates being $128,681.00. Now, 
Respondent is entitled to reasonable expenses to operate his 
business. The Court having examined the expenses of Respondent as 
he has related them on his tax return and having considered his 
testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his expenses 
in the tax returns. The Court finds that reasonable expenses for 
Respondent are $40,000.00 per year. Taking the imputed gross 
receipts of $128,681.00 less the $40,000.00 expenses, the Court 
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finds that Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child 
support and alimony is $88,681.00 or $7,390.00 per month. 
10. Petitioner is entitled to receive and Respondent is 
ordered to pay child support pursuant to the guidelines using an 
income for Respondent of $7,390.00 and imputing to Petitioner 
$1,000.00. The Court imputes income to Petitioner because she has 
a Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the 
ability to work and to earn income of at least $1,000.00 per month. 
The Court finds that child support would be $1,482.00 per month. 
Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the month 
of February 1998. 
11. Petitioner has reasonable monthly expenses in the 
amount of $4,000.00 per month. The Court finds that she has the 
ability to make $1,000.00 per month which would calculate to 
approximately $750.00 in net income that she can generate on her 
own. That leaves expenses to be covered of $3,250.00. She has a 
child support award of $1,438.00 per month which would leave the 
amount of $1,768.00 in expenses that would not be covered by her 
income or child support. Petitioner has a need for alimony. 
Respondent has a gross monthly income for purposes of calculating 
alimony of $7,390.00 per month. After taxes, the Court finds that 
he has a net income of approximately $5,500.00 and reasonable 
expenses of $2,500.00 per month. This leaves Respondent with the 
ability to pay approximately $3,000.00 per month toward child 
support and alimony. He is ordered to pay $1,482.00 per month in 
child support, which leaves $1,518.00 which he has the ability to 
pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony. Based on the need of 
Petitioner and the ability of Respondent to pay, the Court will 
order that Respondent pay to Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in 
alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13 years. The 
court approves the amount of child support ordered knowing that 
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such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set forth on the 
table. The Court finds that Petitioner has made significant 
sacrifice during the terms of the marriage as the Respondent has 
pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training. Respondent's 
degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due 
to some extent to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. 
Respondent will benefit hereafter until he retires and the Court 
finds that it is appropriate that Petitioner benefit from her 
efforts and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years. The 
Court will term this minimum period of alimony as reimbursement 
alimony. Alimony shall terminate after five years upon the 
remarriage or cohabitation of Petitioner. 
12. In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate 
in this case to likewise make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property. The parties have acquired a home in Layton, 
Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300.00 and a mortgage 
balance of $92,258.00. The equity of the parties in that real 
property is $27,042.00. The Court finds it equitable to award 
Petitioner the martial home, and the entire equity in the home. 
The Court acknowledges that $6,000.00 came from Respondent's 
grandfather and was used as the down payment for the purchase of 
the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6,000.00 
to have been a gift to both parties. Petitioner will be 
responsible for paying the mortgage payment and hold the Respondent 
harmless in the event of her nonpayment. 
13 . The parties have acquired certain personal property 
during the term of the marriage. The Court will award the property 
that is currently in the possession of each party to that party 
except as hereafter noted. The Court finds that Petitioner has 
certain items of personal property that are Respondent's and she 
should transfer that property to the Respondent as soon as 
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possible. Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique 
hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and 
wagon. In addition, Petitioner is to give Respondent access to 
family photos that may be copied. The Court notes that Respondent 
may have real property that was gifted to him by his family and 
will order that the Petitioner have no interest in any real 
property that he may own separately. The Court awards to 
Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two automobiles. 
14. The parties have acquired certain debts and 
obligations during the term of their marriage. The Court will 
order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. Following the parties' 
separation in October 1996, Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39 
to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to 
Petitioner and for clothes purchased by Respondent's use. 
Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest 
accrued thereon which was $971.12 as of date of trial. In addition, 
the Court will order that Respondent be responsible for his student 
loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
15. Each party will be responsible for the filing of 
their own separate tax returns for the years 1996 and 1997. The 
Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and the 
oldest child to Petitioner and will award the exemption for the 
middle child to Respondent. 
16. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction 
against either party interfering with credit or accounts of the 
other party. 
17. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction 
against either party from harming, harassing, going to the home or 
work place of the other except for purposes of exercising 
visitation. 
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18. The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in 
his alimony and child support obligation through the month of 
January 1997 in the amount of $13,350.00. The Court will enter a 
judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in that amount. 
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the 
ability to pay each and every month and that is why the arrearage. 
The Court finds that during the period that Respondent was ordered 
to pay that he leased two automobiles of which he only needed one 
and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary. The 
Court will find that he had the ability to pay the amount that he 
was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully violated the 
order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt. The 
Court will order that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail 
but will suspend the jail time on condition that he strictly follow 
the orders of the Court in the future. In addition, the Court will 
award some attorney's fees that will be calculated later. 
19. Petitioner has an ongoing responsibility to provide 
Respondent with visitation with the minor children. The Court 
finds that Petitioner has willfully violated the order of the Court 
in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will 
find her in contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in 
the Davis County Jail. The Court will suspend the jail time on 
condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the 
future. 
20. The parties each have had to incur substantial 
attorney's fees in this matter to get the case to trial. The Court 
will find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that Petitioner, with her 
limited income and resources, does not have the ability to pay her 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that reasonable attorney's 
fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular 
12 
case is $2 0,000*00. The Court finds that while Petitioner does not 
have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will 
enter a judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in the 
amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees. 
21. It is the understanding of the Court that neither 
party has any retirement benefits and thus there would be nothing 
to share pursuant to Woodward. 
22. Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the 
execution of any documents necessary to finalize this order, or for 
property distribution, custody, visitation, and child support under 
the terms of the divorce decree. 
23. Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 set forth $847.81 in child 
medical expenses as of date of trial. On June 29, 1998, Respondent 
paid to Petitioner the amount of $423.90 which represents full 
payment of Respondent's one-half of the medical expenses owed as of 
trial. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. DIVORCE GRANTED: Petitioner should be awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony presently existing between the parties. Such Decree 
should become final on entry upon the records of the Court. 
B. CUSTODY, SUPPORT, ALIMONY AND VISITATION; The 
custody of and visitation with the parties' minor children, the 
child support, and the alimony should be ordered in accordance with 
the Findings herein. 
C. DEBTS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: In making the 
alimony and child support findings above, the Court has taken into 
account the allocation of debts, the distribution of property, and 
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the insurance provisions contained herein; each such item should be 
ordered in accordance with those Findings. 
D. MISCELLANEOUS: The costs and attorney's fees, life 
insurance, health insurance and other miscellaneous provisions 
should be ordered in accordance with the Findings herein. 
DATED this S *^ day of July, 1998. 
MICHAEL Of / ALLPI 
District ''Judge 
RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual, 
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this X **~^ day of July, 1998. The undersigned 
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at 
the expiration of the appropriate time. 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 sT^ ^ ^^3-? . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 /Z*^^^^^^P^^Z^r 
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PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #2331 
Attorney for Petitioner 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
Fax: (801) 298-8950 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE JOHNSON, ] 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ! 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, ] 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 964701989DA 
) JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February, 
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding. 
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen, 
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and 
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record. 
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and 
being fully advised in the premises and having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, makes 
and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. DIVORCE GRANTED: Petitioner is hereby granted a 
Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby severing the bonds of 
matrimony heretofore existing between the parties. Said Decree to 
become final upon entry in the official records of the clerk of 
Davis County, State of Utah, automatically and without further 
action by the parties. JUDGMEfSffENTERED 
BY 'h £s 
2. CUSTODY: Petitioner is awarded the sole care, 
custody and control of the following minor children born of this 
marriage: Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, 
born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. 
However, pursuant to § 30-3-33 Utah Code Annotated, Respondent is 
entitled to all statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial 
parent, which shall include the following: 
(a) Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, 
sports and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and Respondent shall be 
entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(b) Respondent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and day care reports and 
medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(c) Each parent shall provide the other with their 
current address and telephone number at this time and within 
24 hours of any change; 
(d) Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail 
privileges with the children; 
(e) Parental care shall be presumed to be better 
care for the children than surrogate care and the Court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing Respondent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(f) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care 
providers with the name, current address, and telephone number 
of the other parent and shall provide each other with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate 
care providers unless the Court for good cause orders 
otherwise. 
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3. VISITATION: Respondent is entitled to reasonable 
rights of visitation with the minor children and the Court orders 
that at a minimum he should receive the standard rights of 
visitation as set forth in the statute. Even though the minor 
child Kevyn is not quite three years old, the Court will order that 
Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as he does the 
older children and that is the standard visitation for children 
over five. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation 
shall be as follows: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m. ; 
(b) Alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled 
school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for 
the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday 
or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that 
time so that the child is free from school and the parent is 
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to 
this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or 
after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
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(ii) Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school 
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as 
the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for 
the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
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(v) the fall school break, if applicable, 
commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas 
school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial 
parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option 
of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject 
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical 
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
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(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, 
the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours 
and for reasonable duration. 
4. DAY CARE EXPENSES: The parties ar$ ordered to be 
responsible for one-half of the actually incurred day care expenses 
when the custodial parent is working. Those expenses must be 
reasonable as compared to day care services generally. The non-
custodial parent is entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day 
care if h$ is available on a regular basis to do so. if Petitioner 
pursues her education to get a teaching certificate in an area 
other than English or to obtain another degree requiring similar 
schooling, Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the day 
care which is incurred as a result thereof. /n#&ty^, tfaut <c* 
5. PRIVATE SCHOOL: Petitioner s h a l f b e S s ^ 
all costs associated with the children's enrollment in private 
school, if she chooses to enroll the children in a private school. ^r 
6. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Respondent is 
ordered to provide health and accident insurance tox the benefit of 
the minor children. The Court having considered the financial 
circumstances and abilities of the parties relating to the payment 
of the insurance premium orders that Respondent shall be 
responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be 
entitled to any offset against child support for that premium. 
However, the parties will each be responsible for one-half of the 
non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. Pursuant to 
§ 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be ordered to 
provide written notification of the cost and payment of medical 
expenses to Respondent within 30 days of payment. Respondent 
should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his one-half of those 
expenses within 15 days after receiving notification. 
7. LIFE INSURANCE: Respondent is directed to maintain 
a life insurance policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor 
children named as exclusive beneficiaries. In the event of the 
Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the 
support of the minor children. Respondent is ordered to provide 
proof of maintenance of such insurance to Petitioner. 
8. CHILD SUPPORT: On the basis of Respondent's income 
of approximately $7,390.00 per month, Petitioner's imputed earnings 
of approximately $1,000.00 per month, and further as consideration 
for the other aspects of the property settlement, debt allocation 
and insurance provisions contained herein, Respondent should be 
ordered to pay to Petitioner as and for child support during the 
minority of the parties' children and through their graduation from 
high school, whichever is later, the sum of $1,482.00 per month 
commencing on the Fifth day of February, 1998, and payable in equal 
installments on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month 
thereafter. The Court approves the amount of child support ordered 
knowing that such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set 
forth on the table. 
9. ALIMONY: Based upon the need of Petitioner and the 
ability of Respondent to pay, Respondent is ordered to pay to 
Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in alimony for a minimum of five 
years and a maximum of 13 years. The Court will term this minimum 
period of alimony as reimbursement alimony. Alimony shall 
terminate after five years upon the remarriage or cohabitation of 
Petitioner. Said alimony payment shall commence on the Fifth day 
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of February, 1998, and payable in equal installments on the Fifth 
and Twentieth days of each month thereafter. 
10. REAL PROPERTY: In consideration for the child 
support, alimony, debt allocation, and other provisions in this 
action, the real property of the marriage is awarded and allocated 
as follows: 
A. PETITIONER is awarded all right title and 
interest in the marital residence located at 946 North 1500 East, 
Layton, Utah 84041 and more particularly described as: 
All of Lot 17, Roueche Hills Subdivision, No. 
2, A subdivision of part of Section 22, 
Township 4 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian in the city of Layton, Davis County, 
Utah. 
Such award should be made subject to the debt thereon, and 
Petitioner is ordered to hold harmless and defend Respondent from 
any non-payment. 
B. Respondent is awarded no equity in the marital 
residence. 
11. PERSONAL PROPERTY: The parties have acquired 
certain personal property during the term of the marriage. The 
Court will award the property that is currently in the possession 
of each party to that party except as hereafter noted. The Court 
finds that Petitioner has certain items of personal property that 
are Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the 
Respondent as soon as possible. Those items are the trophy 
baseball, a box of antique hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" 
on it, and a tricycle and wagon. In addition, Petitioner is to 
give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied. The 
Court notes that Respondent may have real property that was gifted 
to him by his family and will order that the Petitioner have no 
interest in any real property that he may own separately. The 
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Court awards to Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two 
automobiles. 
12. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties have acquired 
certain debts and obligations during the term of their marriage. 
Each party is ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. Following the parties' 
separation in October 1996, Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39 
to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to 
Petitioner and for clothes purchased by Respondent's use. 
Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest 
accrued thereon which was $971.12 as of date of trial. In 
addition, the Court orders that Respondent be responsible for his 
student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
13. TAX RETURNS FOR 1996 AND 1997: Each party will be 
responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns for 
the years 1996 and 1997. 
14. TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner is awarded the tax 
exemptions for the youngest child and the oldest child and 
Respondent is awarded the tax exemption for the middle child. 
15. PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS: The Court will issue a 
permanent mutual injunction against either party interfering with 
credit or accounts of the other party. Furthermore, the Court will 
issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party from 
harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other 
except for purposes of exercising visitation. 
16. CONTEMPT/JUDGMENT FOR DELINQUENT SUPPORT; 
Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent in the amount of 
$13,350.00 as and for past due alimony and child support through 
the month of January 1998. The Court having found that Respondent 
had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing 
basis and that he willfully violated the order of the Court hereby 
finds him in contempt. The Court will order that he spend five 
9 
days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on 
condition that he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the 
future. In addition, the Court will award some attorney's fees 
that will be calculated later. 
17. CONTEMPT RE VISITATION; Petitioner has an ongoing 
responsibility to provide Respondent with visitation with the minor 
children. The Court having found that Petitioner has willfully 
violated the order of the Court in this respect and that she denied 
visitation hereby finds her in contempt of Court and orders that 
she spend five days in the Davis County Jail. The Court will 
suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the 
orders of the Court in the future. 
18. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Petitioner is awarded judgment 
against Respondent in the amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees. 
19. RETIREMENT: As a result of the representations to 
the Court that neither party has any retirement benefits, no 
allocation of said retirement is necessary. 
20. PAST DUE MEDICAL EXPENSES: Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 
set forth $847.81 in child medical expenses as of date of trial. 
On June 29, 1998, Respondent paid to Petitioner the amount of 
$423.90 which represents full payment of Respondent's one-half of 
the medical expenses owed as of trial. 
21. SIGNING OF PAPERS: Each of the parties is ordered 
to cooperate in the execution of any documents necessary to 
finalize this order, or for property distribution, custody, 
visitation, and child support under the terms of the divorce 
decree. sj_ 
DATED this / S day of July, 1998. 
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RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual, 
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this ZZ**^ day of July, 1998. The undersigned 
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at 
the expiration of the appropriate time. 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law ^^^ 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 y ^ ^ / , ?**~2^? ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 X^^^7 ^^^^^>&^ 
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